In this paper, we explore and compare the operation of profit making (PMOs) and not-for-profit (NPOs) day care centers using data from a random sample of Massachusetts day care centers. We find many differences in the characteristics of PMOs and NPOs. Most interestingly, NPOs pay significantly higher wages than PMOs although the staff of NPOs has aproximately the same education and less experience than the staff of PMOs. NPOs also have significantly more staff per child than PMOs. We estimate separate cost functions for PMOs and NPOs and find the parameters of these functions to be insignificant different implying that the higher observed costs for NPOs result from different input (e.g., paying higher wages) and output (e.g., more interaction and larger size) choices and not from differences in methods of operation. Finally, we find that current monetary and inkind subsidies have no significant effect on the costs of day care centers.
1~ Introduction
In this paper, we estimate cost functions for both not-for-profit and for-profit day care centers using data from Massachusetts, testing, in particular, for differences in behavior between the for-profit and not-for-profit firms. Massachusetts was chosen since it has one of the best data sets currently available. In the process, we deal with problems of defining and measuring the output of day care, and also grapple with the difficult issue of measuring quality appropriately in the day care context. The impetus for this paper arose from the increasing concern regarding the affordability of day care. The need for child care has escalated in recent years as a result of two demographic trends: the rapid, continuing increase in maternal employment in the last decade and a half and an even higher increase in the number of single parent households. 1 Parents have a range of options to choose from. These could include, apart from formal centerbased care, family day care whether licensed or unlicensed, care by relatives and babysitters at home. The question arises: what determines the price of day care? A complete answer to this question requires an examination and estimation of both supply and demand factors in the context of a full-fledged model of the day care industry. Rising prices may follow from high costs due to output levels, technology, low productivity of factors, high input costs, and/or rapidly increasing demand. This paper investigates the supply aspect of the problem by focusing on the cost determinants in the case of day care centers in S. MUKERJEE AND A.D. WlTTE Massachusetts. The latter comprise a significant subset of all day care options caring for 16% of infants, 31% of toddlers, 66% of pre-schoolers and 7% of schoolgoing children in nonparental care. 2
The day care industry in Massachusetts is characterized by both for-profit and not-forprofit firms. Cost functions were estimated separately for the profit and the not-for-profit sectors and the results analyzed in the context of current literature on NPOs. A major conclusion from the analysis is that the not-for-profit firms do not behave differently from their for-profit counterparts, in that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that their cost functions are the same.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains the background and literature survey. A discussion of descriptive statistics follows in Section 3. Section 4 contains the theoretical underpinnings in two parts. The first part deals with the functional specification of the model and is followed by a discussion of the conceptual issues regarding the measurement of output and quality in the second part of the section. The data and empirical formulation of the model is discussed in Section 5. Results and concluding remarks are in Sections 6 andT.
Background and Literature Survey
Economists are well versed in the operation of profit-making organizations, but may be less familiar with not-for-profit entities and the literature that relates to them. The crucial property that distinguishes a not-for-profit (NPO) firm from its for-profit counterpart (PMO), is that it is legally prohibited from distributing any profits that may be earned. This is now widely known in the literature as the "nondistribution constraint" following Hansmann [1980] . Note that there is no bar to the earning of profits per se. Hansmann notes that there are limitations to policing the adherence to such a constraint and some NPOs circumvent the requirement through various means such as "excessive salaries, low interest loans from the organization, personal services and amenities paid for out of the organization's funds." The nondistribution constraint results in special tax treatment for NPOs by both federal and state governments. These concessions (which can vary amongst NPOs) apply to individual and corporate taxes, estate and gift taxes, and some excise taxes. Within the notfor-profit sector, a distinction may be drawn between those that are "donative" (donations comprise a large proportion of earnings), and those that are "commercial" (sales of goods and services provide a major or only source of income)? These two categories are not mutually exclusive and an NPO day care center can be a bit of both.
Bearing in mind the special features of NPOs in general, we turn to the theories on nonprofit organizations. These theories fall into two categories. One deals with the role of NPOs (e.g., why NPOs have arisen in particular industries) and the second category deals with the behavior of NPOs. 4 In explaining why NPOs have risen in particular industries, it is generally agreed that it is due to market failure (e.g., contract failure or public goods) 5 which was strong enough to overcome the inherent disadvantages of NPO firms in regard to their access to capital, the efficiency of their operations, and the rapidity with which they can respond to demand (Hansmann [1980] ). 6
There are a number of theories related to the behavior of NPOs. A major set of theories assume maximizing behavior. However, these theories disagree concerning exactly what is
